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GROUNDING AND TRUTH-FUNCTIONS
FABRICE CORREIA
Philosophers often make claims to the effect that certain facts obtain in virtue
of, or are grounded in, other facts.1 Among them one can nd the following,
or variants thereof:2
(1) Mental facts obtain in virtue of neurophysiological facts;
(2) Dispositional properties are grounded in categorical properties;
(3) Legal facts are grounded in non-legal, e.g. social, facts;
(4) Morally wrong acts are wrong in virtue of non-moral facts;
(5) Normative facts are grounded in natural facts;
(6) Semantic properties are exemplied in virtue of certain non-semantic
properties being exemplied;
(7) Determinables are exemplied in virtue of corresponding determi-
nates being exemplied;
(8) Universals exist in virtue of their having exempliers;
(9) The existence of a whole is grounded in the existence of its parts;
(10) Any given whole exists in virtue of the fact that its parts exist and are
arranged in such and such a way;
(11) The existence of a non-empty set is grounded in the existence of its
members;
(12) Events are grounded in facts about their participants;
(13) Tropes are grounded in facts about their bearers;
(14) Holes are grounded in facts about their hosts;
1 I wish to thank the participants of the PALMYR VII workshop (Paris, October 2008)
and those of the Methodological Issues in Contemporary Analytic Philosophy workshop
(Ghent, April 2009) for helpful discussions on some parts of this paper. I am also grate-
ful to Paul Audi, Kit Fine, Ghislain Guigon and an anonymous referee for their very helpful
comments on earlier drafts of this paper. This work was carried out while I was a Swiss
National Science Foundation professor (project PP001-114758) and a member of the Span-
ish research project ‘Aspectos modales del realismo materialista’ (project HUM2007-61108
(MCYT), Girona, dir. Joan Pagès). The research leading to these results has also received
funding from the European Community’s Seventh Framework Programme FP7/2007-2013
under grant agreement no. FP7-238128.
2 See e.g. Correia 2005 and Rosen 2010.
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(15) Every truth is made true, i.e. given any truth, some entity (or entities)
is (are) such that that truth is true in virtue of the existence of this
entity (these entities).
These claims and their negations constitute important philosophical theses,
and, as the list indicates, talk of facts being grounded in other facts does
not belong to a limited range of philosophical disciplines: it spreads over all
areas of philosophy.
How is the relevant notion of grounding to be understood? A natural view
on the issue invokes modality. The idea is that grounding should be char-
acterized in terms of the notion of necessity, e.g. along the following lines:
a fact is grounded in other facts iff (i) the latter facts obtain, and (ii) neces-
sarily, if they obtain, then the former fact obtains as well. Yet a number of
recent works convincingly questions the possibility of such modal render-
ings of the notion, and some authors even take the notion to be primitive,
incapable of being characterized in fundamentally different terms.3
I am inclined to think that grounding cannot be understood in different
terms. Whether this is right or wrong, however, I take it  certainly with
many others  that a great deal of claricatory work on the notion still needs
to be done. This paper is intended to contribute to such a work, with a special
emphasis on formal / logical issues pertaining to the notion of grounding.
The focus of the paper is the propositional logic of grounding, i.e. the logic
of the interaction between the notion of grounding and the truth-functions.4
The plan of the paper is the following. I rst discuss the question of the
logical form of statements of grounding (§1). There I distinguish between
the predicational view on the logical form of these statements, and the oper-
ational view, which I endorse. I then introduce the notions of factual identity
and factual equivalence, and argue that the formulation of a logic of ground-
ing must go in tandem with the formulation of a logic of factual identity
in case one opts for predicationalism, and of a logic of factual equivalence
3 See Audi ms, Correia 2005, Rosen 2010.
4 Some clarificatory work on the notion of grounding, in particular on its logical proper-
ties, has been carried out by several authors, largely independently from each other. Bolzano
1973 is a notable precursor. In contemporary analytic philosophy, the notion has been largely
ignored as a proper topic of philosophical inquiry until recent years. The most important
works I am aware of are Audi ms, Correia 2005, Fine 2001, msa and msb, Rosen 2010,
Schnieder 2004, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2008 and ms. These works do not comprise prop-
erly logical studies of the sort I undertake in this paper, except for Fine msa and msb and
Schnieder ms. These studies differ from the present one in important respects. In partic-
ular, Fine msa, contrary to Fine msb, does not deal with the interaction of grounding and
truth-functions, and Schnieder ms studies only a binary notion of partial grounding, whereas
I study a many-to-one notion of total grounding. I will point to other differences and to
similarities between our respective works in due course.
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if one opts for operationalism (§2). In §3, I dene the language relative to
which I subsequently formulate the logic of grounding and factual equiva-
lence. In §4 I lay down structural principles for grounding and factual equiv-
alence. In §5, I then propose principles for the logic of factual equivalence
and truth-functions, and in §6, I do the same for the logic of grounding and
truth-functions. Finally, I present a semantical characterization of the re-
sulting logical system and prove the system to be sound and complete with
respect to the semantics (§7).
1. Logical Form
In this section I rst distinguish between the predicational and the opera-
tional views about the logical form of statements of grounding and advo-
cate the latter view (§1.1), and I then argue that grounding is many-to-one
(§1.2).
1.1. Predicational vs. Operational
Grounding claims usually take one of the following grammatical forms:
(1) The fact that p is grounded in the fact that q, the fact that r, ...;
(2) p in virtue of the fact that q, the fact that r, ...;
(3) p because q, r, ...;
(4) The fact that p is explained by the fact that q, the fact that r, ....
(1)(4) have various apparent logical forms. Granted that (1)(4) can be
used interchangeably to say the very same thing, this variety must be only
apparent, and so arises the question which underlying logical form we should
take grounding claims to have.
There are two natural views on that matter. On one view, the most basic
notion of grounding is to be expressed by means of a relational predicate,
say ‘IS GROUNDED IN’, which takes designators for facts to make sentences.
That view naturally comes to mind if we draw our attention to the surface
grammar of (1) or (4). On the other view, the most basic notion of grounding
is to be expressed by means of a sentential operator, say ‘BECAUSE’, which,
like e.g. the truth-functional connectives ‘and’ and ‘not’, takes sentences to
make a sentence. That view naturally comes to mind if we focus on the
surface grammar of (3). Call the rst view predicational and the second
operational.5
5 One can think of a third view on which the most basic notion of grounding is to be
expressed by means of a hybrid expression as suggested by (2). That view strikes me as very
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I took care to dene these two views as views concerning the logical cat-
egory the most basic notion of grounding belongs to. This is because once
a certain notion of grounding belonging to a logical category is given, it is
possible, in some cases granted certain assumptions about the ontology of
facts and the expressivity of our language for facts, to dene another notion
of grounding belonging to a different logical category. Thus, assuming the
predicational view, we can dene a sentential operator ‘bec’ as follows:
• p bec q, r, ... iffdf the fact that p IS GROUNDED IN the fact that q, the
fact that r, ....
And assuming the operational view, granted obvious assumptions about the
ontology of facts and the expressivity of our language for facts, we can dene
a predicate ‘is gred in’ on facts as follows:
• The fact that p is gred in the fact that q, the fact that r, ... iffdf p
BECAUSE q, r, ....
Which conception of the most basic notion of grounding should be adop-
ted?6 I will go for the operational approach. My preference goes to that
approach for reasons of ontological neutrality: it should be possible to make
claims of grounding and fail to believe in facts.7 Yet, for the sake of lin-
guistic convenience I will feel free to read statements of type ‘p BECAUSE
q, r, ...’ as ‘the fact that p is grounded in the fact that q, the fact that r,
...’, and to use fact-talk in other contexts where such talk is not intended to
be understood literally. Such an informal talk of facts should not result in
misunderstanding.
unnatural, and so I will leave it aside. Yet the material of this paper could easily be adapted
to take it into account.
6 Audi ms and Rosen 2010 express grounding by means of a predicate, Correia 2005,
Fine msa, msb and Schnieder ms (and elsewhere) by means of a sentential operator. Yet they
do so without claiming that the expressions they use are intended to point to the most basic
notion. Mulligan 2004 goes for the operational view.
7 As far as I can see, there are two main objections to admitting facts in one’s ontology.
One is nominalistic in character: accepting the existence of facts is accepting the existence
of abstract entities, but there are no such entities. The other one is that accepting an ontology
of facts amounts to a mistaken projection of features of language onto reality. Of course,
the neutrality I aim for would equally be secured by going predicationalist and having an
appropriately deflationary conception of facts.
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1.2. Grounding as Many-to-one
As was perhaps clear to the reader right from the start, I take grounding
to be essentially many-to-one (and being grounded in to be one-to-many).
Assuming the predicational conception of grounding, the view is that it may
be true that:
(5) x IS GROUNDED IN y, z, ...
without it being true that:
• (x IS GROUNDED IN y) or (x IS GROUNDED IN z) or ....
To put it differently, the view is that some facts may jointly GROUND a fact
without any one of the former facts, taken in isolation, GROUNDING the latter
fact. Assuming the operational conception, the view is that:
(6) p BECAUSE q, r, ...
may be true without:
• (p BECAUSE q) or (p BECAUSE r) or ...
being true.
It may be thought that, despite this feature, every case of grounding re-
duces to a case of one-one grounding. The view I have in mind, applied to
the predicational conception, is that (5) should be understood as saying that
x IS GROUNDED IN a conjunctive fact whose conjuncts are y, z, ...; and
applied to the operational conception, the view is that (6) should be under-
stood as saying that p BECAUSE (q and r and ...). Yet, both reductions are
questionable. For while it is plausible to say that at least some instances of
‘the fact that p and q IS GROUNDED IN the fact that p and the fact that q’ or
of ‘p and q BECAUSE p, q’ are true, no instance of ‘the fact that p and q IS
GROUNDED IN the fact that p and q’ or of ‘p and q BECAUSE p and q’ can be
true: grounding is, I take it, irreexive.8 I shall accordingly treat grounding
as many-to-one.9
8 Most if not all contemporary authors agree on this point. There is a well known philo-
sophical tradition which takes it that there are cases of facts grounded in themselves, most
notoriously facts about God.
9 Most authors do the same. As I previously emphasized, Schnieder ms studies a binary
notion of partial grounding. It may be thought that his notion can be defined in terms of
a many-to-one notion along the following lines: a fact is grounded in another fact (binary
notion) iffdf the former fact is grounded (many-to-one notion) in the latter fact, or in the
latter fact together with other facts.
5
2. Grounding and Factual Equivalence
Take for a moment the predicational view about grounding for granted. Then
the following two general principles connecting grounding and identity be-
tween facts should be countenanced:
• For all facts x, y and z, if both x = y and z IS GROUNDED IN x, then
z IS GROUNDED IN y;
• For all facts x, y and z, if both x = y and x IS GROUNDED IN z, then
y IS GROUNDED IN z.
They are indeed just instances of the Principle of the Indiscernibility of Iden-
ticals for the predicate ‘IS GROUNDED IN’, and to that extent they are uncon-
troversial.
Let me henceforth use ‘[p]’ for ‘the fact that p’. With these principles in
place, the following schemas should be taken to have all their instances true:
• If both [p] = [q] and [r] IS GROUNDED IN [p], then [r] IS GROUNDED
IN [q];
• If both [p] = [q] and [p] IS GROUNDED IN [r], then [q] IS GROUNDED
IN [r].
Thus there naturally arises, in the context of the predicational view about
grounding, the question of when statements of type ‘[p] = [q]’ should be
taken to be true. Given that the canonical way we have at our disposal for
referring to facts, if there are such things, is by means of expressions of type
‘the fact that p’, that question is not a mere side question for the predication-
alist: it is absolutely central.
In the context of the predicational view of grounding, a distinction is
to be made between two classes of conceptions of the nature of facts, the
conceptions of facts as worldly and the conceptions of facts as concep-
tual, which makes a huge difference on the assessment of statements of type
‘[p] = [q]’.10 On a conception of facts as conceptual, which fact is referred
to by means of a description of type ‘[p]’ is highly sensitive to the concepts
involved in that description; on a conception of facts as worldly, there is sig-
nicantly less sensitivity. As an illustration of what I have in mind, consider
the following three lists of facts (a is any arbitrary water molecule):
• [a is a water molecule]; [a is an H2O molecule];
• [France is east of Argentina]; [Argentina is west of France];
10 The distinction appears in Fine msb, where Fine introduces his semantics for the logic
of grounding.
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• [France is east of Argentina]; [it is not the case that it is not the case
that France is east of Argentina].
It will naturally be held, on a conception of facts as worldly, that each list is
constituted by one fact appearing twice. In contrast, on a conception of facts
as conceptual, each list will naturally be taken to comprise two distinct facts.
(Thus, on a conception of facts as conceptual, it is probably more appropriate
to call facts ‘propositions’ rather than ‘facts’.)
Let us now turn to the operational view. Here, of course, the corresponding
issue about the identity of facts does not arise  at any rate, not immediately.
Yet it is my view that something very much like it does arise.
For suppose we are operationalists and want to say e.g. of a certain instance
of ‘p BECAUSE Sam and Maria like each other’ that it is true. Then we will
surely have to say that the corresponding instance of ‘p BECAUSE Maria and
Sam like each other’ is true as well. Why is that? The natural thing to say
here is that there is a sense of ‘saying the same thing’ such that, understood
in that sense we must concede that (i) ‘Sam and Maria like each other’ and
‘Maria and Sam like each other’ say the same thing, and (ii) whenever ‘q’
and ‘r’ say the same thing, ‘p BECAUSE q’ and ‘p BECAUSE r’ are bound
to have the same truth-value. Of course, similar considerations hold if we
start from a given instance of ‘Sam and Maria like each other BECAUSE p’
instead. Thus for the operationalist, there will be a notion of ‘saying the
same thing’ for which he will take all instances of following schemas to be
true:
• If both ‘p’ and ‘q’ say the same thing and ‘r BECAUSE p’ is true, then
‘r BECAUSE q’ is true;
• If both ‘p’ and ‘q’ say the same thing and ‘p BECAUSE r’ is true, then
‘q BECAUSE r’ is true.
Now this being said, there arises the question which statements say the
same thing, in the relevant sense, and which ones do not. For instance, we
may ask:
• Do ‘a is a water molecule’ and ‘a is an H2O molecule’ say the same
thing?
• Do ‘France is east of Argentina’ and ‘Argentina is west of France’
say the same thing?
• Do ‘France is east of Argentina’ and ‘it is not the case that it is not
the case that France is east of Argentina’ say the same thing?
There is room for disagreement. Some operationalists will have a worldly
conception of ‘saying the same thing’, and will in particular naturally take
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the answer to these questions to be positive, while others will have a con-
ceptual conception of ‘saying the same thing’, and will in particular natu-
rally answer these questions negatively.
Thus, corresponding to the issue for predicationalists of how statements of
type:
(7) [p] = [q]
should be assessed, there is the issue for operationalists of how statements
of type:
• ‘p’ and ‘q’ say the same thing
should be assessed, and the latter issue is obviously as important for the
operationalists as the former issue is for the predicationalists.
The notion of saying the same thing has been expressed up to now by
means of a binary predicate on sentences. For reasons of formal homogene-
ity and convenience I will henceforth take it to be canonically expressed by
means of a sentential operator ‘≈’ dubbed ‘factual equivalence’. Thus a
statement of type:
(8) p ≈ q
will be taken to be true iff the corresponding statements ‘p’ and ‘q’ say the
same thing. (8) can itself be read ‘its being the case that p and its being
the case that q are one and the same thing’, or even, informally of course,
as ‘the fact that p and the fact that q are one and the same fact’. I will call
statements of type (7) statements of factual identity and statements of type
(8) statements of factual equivalence. Given my operationalist stance, I will
mainly focus on factual equivalence as opposed to factual identity.
Many alternative conceptions of facts as worldly can certainly be put for-
ward in the context of a theory of grounding, and the same is true of concep-
tions of facts as conceptual. The same holds, mutatis mutandis, for worldly
and conceptual conceptions of factual equivalence. I will largely remain
silent on which conceptions are available and on which are better than oth-
ers  given the scope of this paper there is no need to say much on these
matters.
I will nevertheless adopt a worldly conception of factual equivalence. In
fact, the conceptualist has a very ne-grained conception of factual equiva-
lence, and I believe that this conception is too ne-grained. I take, along with
others, grounding to carve reality at the joints. Now the problem with con-
ceptualism is that, in any of its plausible versions, it yields true statements of
grounding which, intuitively, do not correspond to the way reality is carved
up. Assume for instance with the conceptualist that the two sentences ‘a is
a water molecule’ and ‘a is an H2O molecule’ are not factually equivalent
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(change the example if you do not nd this one appropriate). Then, plau-
sibly, ‘(a is both a water molecule and an H2O molecule) BECAUSE a is a
water molecule, a is an H2O molecule’ is true. Yet it is hard to see how it
could be argued that this truth depicts some aspect of the structure of reality.
Or again, granted that ‘a is a water molecule’ and ‘a is an H2O molecule’ are
not factually equivalent, it is plausible to hold that ‘(a is a water molecule
or 2+2 = 4 BECAUSE a is a water molecule’ and ‘a is an H2O molecule or
2+2 = 4 BECAUSE a is an H2O molecule’ are both true, and express different
truths. Yet one feels that this difference does not correspond to a relevant
metaphysical distinction.11
3. The Formal Language and the Basic Logical Machinery
The language, L, relative to which I will formulate a logic of grounding
and factual equivalence is a propositional language with ∧ (conjunction)
¬ (negation) and ∨ (disjunction) as primitive truth-functional connectives.
Material implication and material equivalence are dened in terms of these
connectives in the usual way: A ⊃ B is dened as ¬A ∨ B and A ≡ B
as (¬A ∨ B) ∧ (¬B ∨ A). L contains the sentential operators ≈ for factual
equivalence and B for grounding. The atoms of L are of two sorts: they
divide into the sentential variables x, y, ..., which we assume to be ordered,
and the sentential constants a, b, .... Language L contains the quantier ∃.
Finally, the brackets ( and ) belong to the vocabulary of L, as well as the list
builder ,.
The basic formulas of L are dened recursively as follows:
• The atoms are basic formulas;
• If p and q are basic formulas, then so are (p ∧ q), (¬p) and (p ∨ q).
A list is a sequence of one or several basic formulas separated by ,. The
formulas of L are dened recursively as follows:
• The basic formulas are formulas;
• If p and q are basic formulas, then (p ≈ q) is a formula;
• If p is a basic formula and ∆ a list, then (pB∆) is a formula;
11 The importance of the notion of factual equivalence or factual identity in the context of
a theory of grounding has not been properly appreciated. Audi ms and Rosen 2010 both take
grounding to be a relation between facts, and both elaborate a bit on the nature of these facts,
but not much. Audi advocates a worldly conception of facts, Rosen a conceptual conception.
It should be noted that in addition to the notion of grounding, which he dubs “strict”, Fine
(msa and msb) introduces a notion of “weak” grounding, which plays a somewhat similar
formal role as factual equivalence. I will comment on Fine’s notion a bit later.
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• If A and B are formulas, then so are (A ∧B), (¬A) and (A ∨B);
• If A is a formula and x a sentential variable, then (∃xA) is a formula.
I will use:
• p, q, ... for arbitrary basic formulas;
• A, B, ... for arbitrary formulas
• ∆, Γ, ... for arbitrary lists;
• ∆̂ for p1 if ∆ is p1, for (p1 ∧ p2) if ∆ is p1, p2, for ((p1 ∧ p2) ∧ p3)
if ∆ is p1, p2, p3, etc.
I will follow standard notational conventions. I dene:
• p ≥d q as ∃x(p ≈ (q ∨ x))
and:
• p ≥cd q as ∃y(p ≥d (q ∧ y))
(x the rst variable in the assumed ordering not free in p or q, and y the
second variable in the assumed ordering not free in p or q.) We may read
p ≥d q as ‘the fact that p disjunctively contains the fact that q’, and p ≥cd
q as ‘the fact that p disjunctively contains some fact which conjunctively
contains q’. Finally, I will use:
• p 6≈ q for ¬(p ≈ q),
• p 6≥d q for ¬(p ≥d q)
and:
• p 6≥cd q for ¬(p ≥cd q).
The logic for language L, which I will call ‘G’, will be formulated in a
Hilbert-style format. I will assume all L-instances of classical tautologies as
axioms of G, Modus Ponens as a rule of the system, and nally I will assume
that standard postulates for existential quantication are also part of G.
Some remarks about the choice of that language are in order.
(1) The language is rst degree: it does not allow for the occurrence of
≈ or B within the scope of an occurrence of ≈ or B. This is mainly due to
the fact that it is hard, except in special cases, to evaluate claims involving
corresponding embeddings, like e.g. many claims of the form ‘(p BECAUSE
q) BECAUSE r’.
(2) The language does not allow for the presence of the quantier within
the scope of ≈ or B. This is due to the fact that the object of this paper is the
study of the interaction between grounding and the truth-functions, not the
study of its interaction with truth-functions and quantication.
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(3) The language only allows for nite lists, whereas it would have been
more natural to allow for lists of arbitrary sizes. That choice was guided by
considerations of simplicity.
(4) The language is quantied, whereas one would have thought that a
purely propositional language could have been appropriate. The reason why
I introduced quantication is that ≥d and ≥cd, which have been dened in
terms of ∃, play a crucial role in the logic I will introduce. Anticipating a lit-
tle bit (see §5), I should say that thanks to the specic logic of factual equiv-
alence I will advocate, it turns out that ≥d and ≥cd are denable without
the help of the quantier, and so a purely propositional logic of grounding
and factual equivalence pretty much like G can be dened, and semantically
characterized in essentially the same way as G (see the last part of §7). Yet I
shall focus on the quantied language, for reasons of naturalness, and also in
order to facilitate the comparison between my logic and the logic of others
for whom ≥d and ≥cd cannot be dened without the help of ∃.
(5) The language does not allow for plural sentential quantiers, whereas
one would have thought that, due to the many-to-one character of grounding,
allowing for plural quantication would have been more natural. There are
two reasons why I left plural quantication aside. The rst is that while sin-
gular sentential quantication is quite controversial, plural sentential quan-
tication is certainly much more controversial. The second reason is that
with plural quantication (standardly interpreted) in place, the prospects of
getting a completeness result of the sort I establish in §7 are null.
4. Structural Principles
Which structural principles, i.e. principles which do not concern the inter-
action with truth-functions, do factual equivalence and grounding conform
to? I suggest that all the L-instances of the following schemas involving ≈
should be amongst the theorems of G:
E1 p ≈ p Reflexivity
E2 (p ≈ q) ⊃ (q ≈ p) Symmetry
E3 (p ≈ q) ∧ (q ≈ r) ⊃ (p ≈ r) Transitivity
E4 (p ≈ q) ⊃ (p ≡ q). Quasi-factivity
as well as all the L-instances of the following formulas involving B:
P (pB∆) ⊃ (pB Γ)  Γ a reordering of ∆ Permutation
R (pB∆) ≡ (pB∆, q)  q any item in ∆ Repetition
S1 (pB∆) ∧ (q ≈ p) ⊃ (q B∆) L-substitution
S2 (pB∆, q) ∧ (q ≈ r) ⊃ (pB∆, r) R-substitution
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G1 (pB∆) ⊃ (p ∧ ∆̂) Factivity
G2 ¬(pB∆, p) Irreflexivity
G3 (pB∆, q) ∧ (q B Γ) ⊃ (pB∆, Γ) Cut
That all the L-instances of E1E4, P, R, S1 and S2 should count as theorems
of G hardly needs to be justied; and there would seem to be an almost
universal consensus that all the L-instances of G1G3 should also count as
such.12
Granted that all the L-instances of the highlighted schemas are theorems of
G, it can be shown that the same goes for all the L-instances of the following
schemas:
• (pB q) ∧ (q ≈ r) ⊃ (pB r) R-substitution∗
• (pB∆) ⊃ (q 6≈ p)  q any item in ∆ Irreflexivity∗
• ¬(pB p) Irreflexivity∗∗
• (pB q) ∧ (q B Γ) ⊃ (pB Γ) Transitivity
• (pB∆, q) ⊃ ¬(q B Γ, p) Anti-circularity
• (pB q) ⊃ ¬(q B p) Asymmetry
I shall take the highlighted schemas for B as axiom schemas for system
G, as well as E2E4 (but under a different name). I will not take E1 as an
axiom schema, though, because it is derivable from further axiom schemas
for factual equivalence I will adopt (see next section).
5. Factual Equivalence and Truth-functions
Which postulates for the interaction between≈ and the truth-functions should
we take for granted?
Let us tackle the question from an informal point of view and let us rst
think about sufcient conditions for factual equivalence. There are three
candidates I wish to mention rst  they are all inadequate, but it will be
instructive to see why:
(a) If ‘p’ and ‘q’ are materially equivalent, then ‘p’ and ‘q’ are factually
equivalent;
(b) If ‘p’ and ‘q’ are metaphysically necessarily equivalent, then ‘p’ and
‘q’ are factually equivalent;
12 See Audi ms, Correia 2005, Fine msa, msb, Rosen 2010, and Schnieder ms for state-
ments / arguments which go in the direction of having some or all of G1–G3. Fine msa does
not have a postulate corresponding to Factivity, but interprets the formulas which flank his
grounding operators as truths.
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(c) If ‘p’ and ‘q’ are logically equivalent according to classical logic,
then ‘p’ and ‘q’ are factually equivalent.
(Classical logical equivalence is understood here in the sense of the classical
propositional calculus.)
Given previously accepted principles, each of the proposed sufcient con-
ditions is too weak. Given that grounding is factive and irreexive, and
obeys the substitution principles formalized as S1 and S2 in system G, a
consequence of (a) is that no instance of ‘p BECAUSE q’ can be true. For
suppose ‘p BECAUSE q’ is true. Then by factivity, ‘p’ and ‘q’ are both true,
and hence materially equivalent. By (a) it follows that ‘p’ and ‘q’ are factu-
ally equivalent, and by a substitution principle that ‘p BECAUSE p’ is true 
which goes against irreexivity.
That the condition in (c)  and consequently, the condition in (b)  is
too weak as well can be argued for on two grounds. The rst has to do
with relevance. Suppose an instance of ‘p BECAUSE q’ is true. Given that
‘q’ and ‘q ∧ (p ∨ ¬p)’ are logically equivalent according to classical logic,
by either (b) or (c) they are factually equivalent, and so by substitution ‘p
BECAUSE q ∧ (p ∨ ¬p)’ should be true. Yet, this will be denied, on the
grounds that (to use the predicationalist idiom) the fact that p ∨ ¬p can play
absolutely no role to help ground the fact that p. The other argument does
not involve relevance, at any rate not in the same way. I take it that on a
worldly conception of factual equivalence, some instances of ‘q ∨ (q ∧ p)’
are not factually equivalent to the corresponding instances of ‘q’, and that
whenever ‘q ∨ (q ∧ p)’ is not factually equivalent to ‘q’ and ‘q’ is true,
‘q ∨ (q ∧ p) BECAUSE q’ should be taken to be true. Now ‘q ∨ (q ∧ p)’ and
‘q’ are classically equivalent, and consequently both (b) and (c) conict with
the worldly conception.13
Interestingly, the second argument against (c) excludes a further sugges-
tion, which invokes relevant equivalence in the sense of the system of rst
degree entailment of Anderson and Belnap (1975):
(d) If ‘p’ and ‘q’ are relevantly equivalent, then ‘p’ and ‘q’ are factually
equivalent.
The suggestion may appear prima facie plausible, since logical relevant
equivalence is signicantly stronger than classical logical equivalence. But
it must be rejected, since ‘q’ and ‘q∨(q∧p)’ are not only logically equivalent
according to classical logic, they are also relevantly so.
13 Fine convinced me that a previous version of the second argument was not effective.
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I wish to suggest that the logic of factual equivalence, taken on a worldly
conception, is the logic of analytic equivalence in the sense of R. B. An-
gell (see Angell 1977, 1989 and Correia 2004).14 Relative to a standard
propositional language with conjunction, negation and disjunction as primi-
tive truth-functional connectives, enriched with the binary sentential opera-
tor ↔ for analytic equivalence, a Hilbert-style axiomatization of the notion
is given by the following axiom schemas and rule of inference:15
ae0 All classical tautologies
ae1 p ↔ ¬¬p
ae2 p ↔ p ∧ p
ae3 p ∧ q ↔ q ∧ p
ae4 p ∧ (q ∧ r) ↔ (p ∧ q) ∧ r
ae5 p ∨ q ↔ ¬(¬p ∧ ¬q)
ae6 p ∨ (q ∧ r) ↔ (p ∨ q) ∧ (p ∨ r)
ae7 (p ↔ q) ⊃ (¬p ↔ ¬q)
ae8 (p ↔ q) ⊃ (p ∧ r ↔ q ∧ r)
ae9 (p ↔ q) ∧ (q ↔ r) ⊃ (p ↔ r)
ae10 (p ↔ q) ⊃ (q ↔ p)
ae11 (p ↔ q) ⊃ (p ≡ q)
ae12 p, p ⊃ q / q
(Notice that p ↔ p follows from ae1, ae9 and ae10, and so need not be
adopted as a further postulate.) I will thus take the result of replacing ↔
by ≈ in ae1-ae11 as further axiom schemas for system G (ae0 and ae12 are
already present).
The objections given above against (a)(d) do not affect the proposed con-
ception of factual equivalence. In fact, the resulting logic of factual equiva-
lence validates neither of the following relevant schemas:
• (p ≡ q) ⊃ (p ≈ q);
• q ≈ (q ∧ (p ∨ ¬p));
• q ≈ (q ∨ (q ∧ p)).
14 I emphasize that I take the logic of the two notions to be the same, because I do not
think the notions are the same. Angell takes analytic equivalence to boil down to a form of
sameness of meaning (1989, p. 119), and I certainly do not want to treat factual equivalence
that way. My work on Angell’s logic, which does not mention the concept of grounding,
derived in fact from my work on the concept: certain properties of the logic made me think
analytic equivalence or some notion in the vicinity could be helpful to model grounding.
15 See Angell 1977. Angell’s system is formulated only with negation and conjunction as
primitive, and he defines disjunction in the usual way in terms of these concepts. Angell thus
does not have axiom schema ae5. And instead of ae11 he has (equivalently given the rest of
the system) (p ↔ p ∧ q) ⊃ (p ⊃ q).
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For the record, an axiomatization of relevant equivalence can be obtained
from ae0-ae12 by adding the axiom schema q ↔ q ∨ (q ∧ p), and by adding
to the latter system the axiom schema q ↔ q ∧ (p ∨ ¬p), ↔ gets to behave
just like material equivalence.
Granted the proposed logic of factual equivalence, the following are the-
orems of system G (the denitions of ≥d and ≥cd have been given in §3):
• p ≥d p
• (p ≥d q) ∧ (q ≥d p) ⊃ p ≈ q
• (p ≥d q) ∧ (q ≥d r) ⊃ (p ≥d r)
• (p ≥d q) ⊃ (p ∧ r ≥d q ∧ r)
• (p ≥d q) ⊃ (p ∨ r ≥d q ∨ r)
• (p ≥d q) ⊃ (p ∨ r ≥d q)
• (p ≥d q) ⊃ (p ≥d p ∧ q)
• (p ≥d q) ⊃ (p ≥d p ∨ q)
• (p ≥d q) ⊃ (q ⊃ p)
• p ≥cd p
• (p ≥cd q) ∧ (q ≥cd r) ⊃ (p ≥cd r)
• (p ≥cd q) ⊃ (p ∧ r ≥cd q)
• (p ≥cd q ∧ r) ⊃ (p ≥cd q)
• (p ≥cd q ∨ r) ⊃ (p ≥cd q)
• (p ≥cd q) ⊃ (p ∨ r ≥cd q)
• (p ≥d q) ⊃ (p ≥cd q)
• (p ≥d q) ∧ (q ≥cd r) ⊃ (p ≥cd r)
• (p ≥cd q) ∧ (q ≥d r) ⊃ (p ≥cd r)
Importantly, the following equivalences, which show that we could have de-
ned ≥d and ≥cd without the resources of existential quantication, also
hold:
d1 (p ≥d q) ≡ (p ≈ q ∨ p)
d2 (p ≥cd q) ≡ (p ≥d q ∧ p)
The right-to-left direction of each equivalence directly follows from quanti-
cation theory. For the other directions, here are informal arguments. (Here
and below, when I present informal arguments there is always a correspond-
ing formal argument.) For d1, suppose p ≥d q, and let x be such that
p ≈ q ∨ x. Then p ∨ q ≈ (q ∨ x) ∨ q, and so p ∨ q ≈ q ∨ x. But then by the
initial assumption, p ≈ q ∨ p. (2) For d2, suppose p ≥cd q, and let y be such
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that p ≥d q∧y. By d1, p ≈ (q∧y)∨p. It follows that q∧p ≈ q∧((q∧y)∨p).
By a distributivity property, we then have q ∧ p ≈ (q ∧ (q ∧ y)) ∨ (q ∧ p),
and so q ∧ p ≈ (q ∧ y) ∨ (q ∧ p). By a distributivity property, we have then
q ∧ p ≈ q ∧ (y ∨ p). It follows that (q ∧ p) ∨ p ≈ (q ∧ (y ∨ p)) ∨ p. By a
distributivity property, it follows that (q∧p)∨p ≈ (q∨p)∧((y∨p)∨p), and
so (q∧p)∨p ≈ (q∨p)∧ (y∨p). By a distributivity property, it follows that
(q∧ p)∨ p ≈ (q∧ y)∨ p. But then by the initial hypothesis, p ≈ (q∧ p)∨ p,
and consequently, p ≥d q ∧ p.
So far for the logic of factual equivalence. It has been formulated on the
assumption of a worldly conception of the notion, which I endorsed from
the beginning. Yet a glimpse at conceptual views on factual equivalence
may be useful for claricatory purposes. How, then, is the conceptualist to
characterize the logic of factual equivalence?
I have no clear view on these matters, only some suggestions. I suggest a
conceptualist may be happy to accept the following schemas, which are all
validated by my logic of worldly factual equivalence:
• p ∧ q ≈ q ∧ p
• p ∧ (q ∧ r) ≈ (p ∧ q) ∧ r
• p ∨ q ≈ q ∨ p
• p ∨ (q ∨ r) ≈ (p ∨ q) ∨ r
• (p ≈ q) ≡ (¬p ≈ ¬q)
• (p ≈ q) ⊃ (p ∧ r ≈ q ∧ r)
• (p ≈ q) ⊃ (p ∨ r ≈ q ∨ r)
• (p ≈ q) ∧ (q ≈ r) ⊃ (p ≈ r)
• (p ≈ q) ⊃ (q ≈ p)
• (p ≈ q) ⊃ (p ≡ q)
A guiding view for the conceptualist might be that two statements containing
different connectives cannot be factually equivalent, as well as statements
containing the same connectives but occurring a different number of times.
A principle which may be added to the previous postulates which conforms
to that view is:
• p 6≈ q if q strictly contains p (i.e. contains, but is not identical to, p).
Of course, with that addition the resulting system is no longer a fragment of
the worldly system.
A stronger guiding view for a conceptualist might be the following: two
statements are factually equivalent iff they have just the same structure and
contain equivalent atoms at the same points in the structure. The newly
added postulate would still hold on that view, but the rst four postulates of
the previous list would have to be dropped. The following principles should
then be added:
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• (p ∧ r ≈ q ∧ r) ⊃ (p ≈ q)
• (p ∨ r ≈ q ∨ r) ⊃ (p ≈ q)
Notice that neither of these principles hold in the worldly system. Take the
rst one for instance. In the worldly system, (q ∧ r) ∧ (q ∧ r) ≈ q ∧ (q ∧ r)
is a theorem, and yet (q ∧ r) ≈ q is not. Also notice that for a conceptualist,
p 6≈ q ∨ p and p 6≥d q ∧ p must hold, and so he cannot accept d1 if he grants
that some instances of p ≥d q can be true, and d2 if he grants that some
instances of p ≥cd q can be true.
6. Grounding and Truth-functions
Let us nally turn to the question which postulates for the interaction be-
tween B and the truth-functions should be accepted. For the sake of read-
ability, in this section I shall use:
• A
A0
for A ⊃ A0
• A B
A0
for (A ∧B) ⊃ A0
• A B C
A0
for ((A ∧B) ∧ C) ⊃ A0
and so on.
6.1. A First Shot
Some authors would be happy to endorse principles like the following:
t1
p
p ∨ q B p
q
p ∨ q B q
t2
p q
p ∧ q B p, q
t3
p
¬¬pB p
Yet they conict with previously accepted postulates. By the previously ac-
cepted logic of factual equivalence, p ≈ p ∨ p, p ≈ p ∧ p and p ≈ ¬¬p are
validated. As a consequence, accepting any of these principles for B would
result in a conict with L-substitution and Irreexivity∗∗ (replace q by p in
t1 and t2). Notice that the problem is intimately tied to the proposed logic
of factual equivalence. On a conceptualist view of the sort depicted in the
previous section, none of p ≈ p ∨ p, p ≈ p ∧ p and p ≈ ¬¬p would be
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validated  actually, their negations would be. Conceptualists can, and ar-
guably will, endorse t1t3. Conversely, I take it that anyone who accepts
any one of these principles is committed to conceptualism.16 ,17
In order to avoid such a clash, one may wish to modify the principles by
imposing suitable conditions:
T1
p ∨ q 6≈ p p
p ∨ q B p
p ∨ q 6≈ q q
p ∨ q B q
T2
p ∧ q 6≈ p p ∧ q 6≈ q p q
p ∧ q B p, q
T3
¬¬p 6≈ p p
¬¬pB p
On the logic of factual equivalence I advocated, the second part of T1 is
redundant given the rst part (and vice versa), and T3 trivially holds because
the negation of its rst antecedent is validated. Yet given that ¬¬p ≈ p, is
16 Correia 2005, Fine msa, msb, Rosen 2010 and Schnieder ms explicitly endorse some of
the three principles. (Fine msa does not deal with the logic of grounding and truth-functions,
but he informally mentions t2 as being correct.)
17 At this point some words about Fine’s notion of weak grounding are in order. Weak
grounding is, just like grounding, many-to-one. Fine understands ‘the fact that p is weakly
grounded in the fact that q, and the fact that r, and ...’ as:
(wg) For it to be the case that p is for it to be the case that q, and for it to be the case that
r, and ...
The one-one locution ‘for it to be the case that p is for it to be the case that q’ is familiar
enough, the many-to-one notion Fine has in mind is not. Crucially, (wg) is not to be under-
stood as the one-one form ‘for it to be the case that p is for it to be the case that (q and r
and ...)’, for Fine holds that although the fact that p is weakly grounded in the fact that p
and the fact that p (granted that p is true), the fact that p can never be weakly grounded in
the fact that p ∧ p. Fine cashes out the notion of weak grounding in terms of the notion of
strict grounding as follows: [p] is weakly grounded in [q1], [q2], ... iff (i) whenever [p′] is
strictly grounded in [p], [r1], [r2]..., [p′] is strictly grounded in [q1], [q2], ..., [r1], [r2]..., and
(ii) whenever each of [q1], [q2], ... is strictly grounded in [r1], [r2]..., [p] is strictly grounded
in [r1], [r2].... He mentioned to me that he would take factual equivalence to be just mutual
weak ground (p ≈ q iff [p] is weakly grounded in [q], and [q] in [p]). It might be thought
that weak grounding can be defined as the converse of what I called disjunctive containment,
more precisely that (wg) can be understood as p ≥d ((q ∧ r) ∧ ...). The two notions indeed
share many formal properties. Yet Fine wants to say that for p true, the fact that p ∧ p is
weakly grounded in the fact that p, while p∧ p ≥d p just means ∃x(p∧ p ≈ p∨x), and I do
not think this is something a conceptualist like Fine would accept e.g. in case p is atomic. It
is not clear to me whether weak grounding could be defined in terms of factual equivalence
in some other way.
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validated, by L-substitution and Irreexivity∗∗, ¬¬pB p can never hold. We
are thus left with the rst part of T1 (or its second part), and T2.
6.2. Some Problems, and Resulting Modifications
T1 and T2 are problematic in the presence of a further plausible principle,
namely:
N ¬(pBp ∧ q, ∆)
which, thanks to Permutation and Repetition, yields:
N∗ ¬(pBp ∧ q)
(I will not take N as axiomatic since it follows from further axioms I will
introduce in the next section.) Let me here argue informally. (1) Suppose p
and p ∨ q 6≈ p. Then by T1, p ∨ q Bp. Suppose now that p ≥cd p ∨ q. Then
for some x, p ≈ p ∨ ((p ∨ q) ∧ x). Then by the logic of factual equivalence,
p ≈ (p ∨ q) ∧ (p ∨ x), and so by R-substitution, p ∨ q B(p ∨ q) ∧ (p ∨ x)
 which contradicts N∗. (2) Suppose p, q, p ∧ q 6≈ p and p ∧ q 6≈ q.
Then by T2 p ∧ q Bp, q. Suppose now that p ≥cd p ∧ q. (The assumption
that q ≥cd p ∧ q would yield to the same kind of problem.) Then for some
x, p ≈ p ∨ ((p ∧ q) ∧ x). Then by the logic of factual equivalence, p ≈
(p∨(p∧q))∧(p∨x), and so by R-substitution, p∧q B(p∨(p∧q))∧(p∨x), q.
Now either p ∧ q ≈ (p ∨ (p ∧ q)) or not. If not, then by T1 and Cut,
p ∨ (p ∧ q)B(p ∨ (p ∧ q)) ∧ (p ∨ x), q  which contradicts N. If so, then
by L-substitution, p ∨ (p ∧ q)B(p ∨ (p ∧ q)) ∧ (p ∨ x), q  which again
contradicts N.
(Notice that for a conceptualist, neither p ≥cd p ∨ q nor p ≥cd p ∧ q can
hold, so the previous difculties do not arise for him.)
Clearly, one can escape these difculties if instead of T1 and T2 one opts
for:
TF1
p cd p ∨ q p
p ∨ q B p
∨-introduction 1
TF2
p cd p ∧ q q cd p ∧ q p q
p ∧ q B p, q
∧-introduction 1
I shall take TF1 and TF2 as axiomatic. (There is no need to add:
•
q cd p ∨ q q
p ∨ q B q
since it follows from TF1, the logic of factual equivalence and L-substitution.)
19
6.3. Further Principles
TF1 is a sort of principle of disjunction-introduction for grounding which
allows one to introduce disjunction from premises which do not contain B,
and TF2 is a sort of principle of conjunction-introduction of the same type.
I also take as axiomatic the following principles of introduction and elim-
ination for both disjunction and conjunction which are of a different sort:
TF3
pB∆
p ∨ q B∆
∨-introduction 2
TF4
pB∆, (r ∨ s) r
pB∆, r
∨-elimination
TF5
pB∆ rB Γ
p ∧ rB∆, Γ
∧-introduction 2
TF6
pB∆, (r ∧ s)
pB∆, r, s
∧-elimination
Notice that thanks to Permutation and Repetition, TF4 and TF6 yield:
•
pB (r ∨ s) r
pB r
•
pB (r ∧ s)
pB r, s
and that principle N from the previous subsection follows from TF6 and
Irreexivity. Also notice that TF3TF6 follow from t1, t2, Cut and Per-
mutation. So conceptualists who endorse the latter principles do not need
TF3TF6 as extra principles.
6.4. The Reduction Axiom
Let us use ∆ cd p for p1 cd p if ∆ is p1, for (p1 cd p ∧ p2 cd p)
if ∆ is p1, p2, for ((p1 cd p ∧ p2 cd p) ∧ p3 cd p) if ∆ is p1, p2, p3,
etc. Informally speaking, ∆ cd p just says that no item q in ∆ is such that
q ≥cd p.
Given previously accepted principles, it can be shown that the following
holds in G:
R+ (∆̂ ∧ (p ≥d ∆̂) ∧ (∆ cd p)) ⊃ (pB∆)
An informal proof runs as follows. (1) Suppose rst that ∆ is a list of one
item, q. Suppose then q cd p. Then by the logic of factual equivalence,
q cd q ∨ p. Suppose now that q. By TF1, it follows that q ∨ pB q. Suppose
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now p ≥d q. Then p ≈ q ∨ p, and so by L-substitution, we get pB q. (2)
Suppose now that ∆ is a list of n items, q1, ..., qn, for n ≥ 2. Suppose q1 cd
p, ..., qn cd p. Then by the logic of factual equivalence, q1 cd q1 ∨ p, ...,
qn cd qn ∨ p. Suppose now q1, ..., qn. By TF1, it follows that q1 ∨ pB q1,
..., qn ∨ pB qn. Dene ri, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, recursively as follows: r1 is (q1 ∨ p);
for every i such that 2 ≤ i ≤ n, ri is (ri−1 ∧ (qi ∨ p)). Then by TF5, we
have rn B∆. Suppose now p ≥d ∆̂. Then p ≈ p∨ ∆̂, and so by the logic of
factual equivalence, p ≈ rn. By L-substitution, we then get pB∆.
We can also show that the following holds in G:
• (pB∆) ⊃ (∆ cd p)
An informal proof for the case where ∆ has only one item, q, runs as follows.
(The case where ∆ has more than one item is exactly similar.) Suppose pB q
and q ≥cd p. Then for some x, q ≈ (p ∧ x) ∨ q. By the logic of factual
equivalence, it follows that q ≈ (q ∨ x) ∧ (p ∨ q). By Substitution and TF6,
we then get pB (q ∨ x), (p ∨ q). By Factivity, p, and so by TF4 we get
pB (q ∨ r), p, which violates Irreexivity.
Since (pB∆) ⊃ ∆̂ directly follows from Factivity, we will thus have the
converse of R+, namely:
R− (pB∆) ⊃ (∆̂ ∧ (p ≥d ∆̂) ∧ (∆ cd p))
provided that we accept the following postulate:
Re (pB∆) ⊃ (p ≥d ∆̂) Reduction axiom
I call it ‘Reduction axiom’ because in its presence, the following reduction
principle follows:18
R (pB∆) ≡ (∆̂ ∧ (p ≥d ∆̂) ∧ (∆ cd p)) Reduction theorem
That is to say, using the language of facts, a fact x is grounded in other
facts iff (i) the latter facts all obtain, (ii) their conjunction is disjunctively
contained in x, and (iii) none of these facts disjunctively contains some fact
18 There is a striking formal similarity between the relationship between B, ≥d and ≥cd
as expressed by the Reduction theorem on one hand, and those between the Finean notions
of strict grounding, weak grounding and partial weak grounding as Fine (msa and msb) sees
them on the other hand. Fine indeed takes it that a fact is strictly grounded in other facts iff
it is weakly grounded in them, and none of the latter facts is partly weakly grounded in the
former fact. Yet, the similarity is of a limited character since, as we saw, weak grounding is
not the converse of disjunctive containment, and accordingly partial weak grounding is not
the converse of ≥cd.
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which conjunctively contains x. Still using factual talk, to say that p ≥d q
is to say that the fact that p is a disjunctive fact with the fact that q as one of
the disjuncts. The idea behind Re is thus that whenever a fact is grounded
in a collection of facts, the grounded fact has a disjunctive nature, and the
conjunction of the grounders is one of its disjuncts  as it were, grounding
always arises via disjunction, in the way encoded by TF1.
Not all instances of Re are plausible. For instance, although one can main-
tain, with some plausibility, that the fact that {Socrates} exists is grounded
in the fact that Socrates exists, view that the former fact is the disjunction of
the latter fact and another fact is implausible. Thus, adding the Reduction
axiom to the previous axiomatic basis yields a theory of grounding which at
best takes care of certain types of grounding ties, and accordingly does not
have full generality. Yet I will take the axiom to be part of G. The reason
is pragmatic, so to speak: with the axiom on board, it is relatively easy to
put forward a semantics for the system with respect to which the system is
sound and complete (see next section), while without the axiom the task is
signicantly harder.
It would be highly desirable to have a semantical characterization of G
minus Re. I hope to be able to provide one in the future. Yet, G is interesting
in its own right, and accordingly having a semantical characterization for
G is a good thing. It is also a good thing for another reason: an important
consequence of the soundness of G is that any (proper or improper) fragment
of G  in particular G minus Re  is consistent.
7. A Semantics for G
In this section I formulate a semantics for language L and show that system
G is sound and complete with respect to that semantics. The semantics is
partly algebraic. It interprets the basic formulas as denoting what I will call
‘facts’, the truth-functional connectives as corresponding to certain opera-
tions on facts, factual equivalence as identity between facts, and grounding
as a certain relation between facts. Thus the semantics can be seen as em-
bodying what I earlier called a predicational view about grounding, and it
actually can be modied in an obvious way to model languages for ground-
ing which, unlike L, treat the notion as expressed by means of a predicate.
Since it is my contention that the operational view on grounding is correct,
I do not take the proposed formal semantics to have a non-ersatzist applied
counterpart which provides truth-conditions for grounding claims.19 In §7.1
19 My stance towards the use of a “factualist” semantics is thus similar to that of the modal
actualist who makes use of Kripke-style formal semantics for modal logics.
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I present system G in compact form, in §7.2 I present the semantics, and
§7.3 deals with soundness and completeness.20
7.1. Review of the System
System G is given by all classical tautologies, a suitable basis for the sen-
tential quantier (any classical set of postulates will do), the rule Modus
Ponens, and the following specic axioms:
Axioms for factual equivalence:
≈1 p ≈ ¬¬p
≈2 p ≈ p ∧ p
≈3 p ∧ q ≈ q ∧ p
≈4 p ∧ (q ∧ r) ≈ (p ∧ q) ∧ r
≈5 p ∨ q ≈ ¬(¬p ∧ ¬q)
≈6 p ∨ (q ∧ r) ≈ (p ∨ q) ∧ (p ∨ r)
≈7 (p ≈ q) ⊃ (¬p ≈ ¬q)
≈8 (p ≈ q) ⊃ (p ∧ r ≈ q ∧ r)
≈9 (p ≈ q) ∧ (q ≈ r) ⊃ (p ≈ r)
≈10 (p ≈ q) ⊃ (q ≈ p)
≈11 (p ≈ q) ⊃ (p ≡ q)
Permutation and repetition:
P (pB∆) ⊃ (pB Γ)  Γ a reordering of ∆ Permutation
R (pB∆) ≡ (pB∆, q)  q any item in ∆ Repetition
Substitution principles:
S1 (pB∆) ∧ (q ≈ p) ⊃ (q B∆) L-substitution
S2 (pB∆, q) ∧ (q ≈ r) ⊃ (pB∆, r) R-substitution
Further structural principles:
G1 (pB∆) ⊃ (p ∧ ∆̂) Factivity
G2 ¬(pB∆, p) Irreflexivity
G3 (pB∆, q) ∧ (q B Γ) ⊃ (pB∆, Γ) Cut
20 Fine (msa and msb) also proposes a factualist semantics, but it is not algebraic. It is
more similar to a regular model-theoretic semantics, although his basic semantic notion is
not that of being true at a point (world, time, etc.), but that of being made true by facts.
Schnieder ms proposes a semantics which is, as he himself grants, somewhat artificial, but
which allows him to prove the consistency of his system.
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Principles for truth-functions:
TF1 (p cd p ∨ q) ∧ p ⊃ (p ∨ q B p) ∨-introduction 1
TF2 (p cd p∧ q)∧ (q cd p∧ q)∧p∧ q ⊃ (p∧ q B p, q) ∧-introduction 1
TF3 (pB∆) ⊃ (p ∨ q B∆) ∨-introduction 2
TF4 (pB∆, r ∨ s) ∧ r ⊃ (pB∆, r) ∨-elimination
TF5 (pB∆) ∧ (q B Γ) ⊃ (p ∧ q B∆, Γ) ∧-introduction 2
TF6 (pB∆, r ∧ s) ⊃ (pB∆, r, s) ∧-elimination
Reduction principle:
Re (pB∆) ⊃ (p ≥d ∆̂) Reduction axiom
7.2. Semantics
We dene a factual structure as a tuple 〈F,u,−, ob〉 where F (facts) is a
non-empty set, u (fact-product) and − (fact-complementation) are binary
/ unary operations on facts meeting the following conditions (we dene t
(fact-union) as follows: α t β := −(−α u −β)):
op1 α = −− α
op2 α = α u α
op3 α u β = β u α
op4 α u (β u γ) = (α u β) u γ
op5 α t (β u γ) = (α t β) u (α t γ)
op6 −α 6= α
ob (obtainment) is a total function from F to {0, 1} satisfying the following
conditions:
ob1 ob(α u β) = 1 iff ob(α) = 1 and ob(β) = 1
ob2 ob(−α) = 1 iff ob(α) = 0
Then:
• ob(α t β) = 1 iff ob(α) = 1 or ob(β) = 1
We dene the binary relations wd and wcd on F as follows: α wd β iff for
some element u of F , α = (β t u); α wcd β iff for some element u of F ,
α wd (β u u). We have the following properties of wd and wcd, structurally
similar to those of ≥d and ≥cd:
• α wd α
• If α wd β and β wd α, then α = β
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• If α wd β and β wd γ, then α wd γ
• If α wd β, then α ∧ γ wd β ∧ γ
• If α wd β, then α ∨ γ wd β ∨ γ
• If α wd β, then α ∨ γ wd β
• If α wd β, then α wd α ∧ β
• If α wd β, then α wd α ∨ β
• If α wd β and ob(β), then ob(α)
• α wcd α
• If α wcd β and β wcd γ, then α wcd γ
• If α wcd β, then α ∧ γ wcd β
• If α wcd β ∧ γ, then α wcd β
• If α wcd β ∨ γ, then α wcd β
• If α wcd β, then α ∨ γ wcd β
• If α wd β, then α wcd β
• If α wd β and β wcd γ, then α wcd γ
• If α wcd β and β wd γ, then α wcd γ
• α wd β iff α = β t α
• α wcd β iff α wd β u α
There are factual structures. Take for instance any non-empty set S and let
s be one of its members. We can then dene a factual structure where F is
the power set of S, u is set-intersection, − is set-complementation, and ob is
dened as follows: for every S ′ ∈ F , ob(S′) = 1 in case s ∈ S ′, ob(S′) = 0
otherwise.
A factual model is a tuple 〈F,u,−, ob, [·]〉, where 〈F,u,−, ob〉 is a factual
structure and [·] an interpretation, i.e. a function which takes every sentential
constant of the language into a fact in F . Relative to a factual model, an as-
signment is a function which takes every sentential variable of the language
into a fact of the model. Two assignments are x-alternatives iff they differ
at most on the value they assign to variable x.
Given any factual model M = 〈F,u,−, ob, [·]〉 and any assignment µ
relative to M , we dene the function [·]µ over the atoms as follows: [a]µ :=
[a]; [x]µ := µ(x). Function [·]µ is then extended to arbitrary basic sentences
thanks to the following clauses:
• [p ∧ q]µ = [p]µ u [q]µ
• [¬p]µ = −[p]µ
• [p ∨ q]µ = [p]µ t [q]µ
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We then have:
o1 ob([p ∧ q]µ) = 1 iff ob([p]µ) = 1 and ob([q]µ) = 1
o2 ob([¬p]µ) = 1 iff ob([p]µ) = 0
o3 ob([p ∨ q]µ) = 1 iff ob([p]µ) = 1 or ob([q]µ) = 1
Given a factual model M = 〈F,u,−, ob, [·]〉, we dene truth in M with
respect to an assignment in the obvious way:
(1) M µ p iff ob([p]µ) = 1
(2) M µ p ≈ q iff [p]µ = [q]µ
(3) M µ pBq1...qn iff
• For all i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ n, ob([qi]µ) = 1
• [p]µ w
d [q1]µ u ... u [qn]µ
• For all i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ n, not: [qi]µ wcd [p]µ
(4) M µ A ∧B iff M µ A and M µ B
(5) M µ ¬A iff M 2µ A
(6) M µ A ∨B iff M µ A or M µ B
(7) M µ ∃xA iff for some x-alternative ρ of µ, M ρ A
(Given o1o3, the presence of 46 alongside with 1 does not yield trouble.)
We have the following derived clauses:
• M µ p ≥
d q iff [p]µ wd [q]µ
• M µ p ≥
cd q iff [p]µ wcd [q]µ
A formula is nally said to be valid iff it is true in every model with respect
to every assignment.
7.3. Soundness and Completeness
It is not difcult, although it takes some patience, to show that system G is
sound respect to the proposed semantics, i.e. that:
Soundness. Every theorem of G is valid.
Given the existence of factual models, this establishes that G is consistent,
as well as any part of it  in particular the system obtained by dropping the
controversial axiom schema Re.
For completeness, we use a standard Henkin-style method. Let Σ be a
consistent set of formulas of L. Let then L+ be any language which differs
from L only in that it has innitely more sentential constants than L. By
a classical result, there exists a set S of L+-formulas which contains Σ, is
maximal, consistent and ∃-complete. We build a model based on S and
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dene an assignment relative to that model, and show that every formula of
S is true, relative to that assignment, in that model. From now on, we shall
work exclusively with L+-formulas.
We have, classically:
• A ∧B ∈ S iff A ∈ S and B ∈ S
• ¬A ∈ S iff A /∈ S
• A ∨B ∈ S iff A ∈ S or B ∈ S
• ∃xA ∈ S iff for some sentential constant a, A[a/x] ∈ S
We dene the relation ∼ on the basic formulas of the language as follows:
p ∼ q iff p ≈ q ∈ S. ∼ is an equivalence relation and we let F be the set of
all the corresponding equivalence classes. We denote the equivalence class
of basic formula p by ‘p’. Notice that:
• For every s ∈ F , if for some p ∈ s, p ∈ S, then for every q ∈ s,
q ∈ S
We dene the operations u and − on F as follows:
• p ∈ s u t iff for some q1 ∈ s, q2 ∈ t, p ≈ q1 ∧ q2 ∈ S
• p ∈ −s iff for some q ∈ s, p ≈ ¬q ∈ S
We then have:
• p ∈ s t t iff for some q1 ∈ s, q2 ∈ t, p ≈ q1 ∨ q2 ∈ S
We can show that:
• For all s, t ∈ F , if for some q1 ∈ s, q2 ∈ t, p ≈ q1 ∧ q2 ∈ S, then for
all q3 ∈ s, q4 ∈ t, p ≈ q3 ∧ q4 ∈ S
• For every s ∈ F , if for some q ∈ s, p ≈ ¬q ∈ S, then for all r ∈ s,
p ≈ ¬r ∈ S
• For all s, t ∈ F , if for some q1 ∈ s, q2 ∈ t, p ≈ q1 ∨ q2 ∈ S, then for
all q3 ∈ s, q4 ∈ t, p ≈ q3 ∨ q4 ∈ S
and:
• p ∧ q = p u q
• ¬p = −p
• p ∨ q = p t q
It is easy to prove that the operations meet conditions op1op6 above. We
dene ob by: ob(s) = 1 if for some p ∈ s, p ∈ S, and ob(s) = 0 otherwise.
Then ob meets the conditions ob1 and ob2. We have then established that
〈F,u,−, ob〉 is a factual structure.
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We nally dene [·] by putting [a] = a, and µ by putting µ(x) = x. We can
then show (by induction on the length of the formulas) that for every basic
formula p, [p]µ = p. We can also show:
• ob([p]µ) = 1 iff p ∈ S
• [p]µ = [q]µ iff p ≈ q ∈ S
• [p]µ w
d [q]µ iff p ≥d q ∈ S
• [p]µ w
cd [q]µ iff p ≥cd q ∈ S
Thanks to result, it is easy to establish:
Truth-lemma. For every L+-formula A, A is true in model 〈F,u,−, ob,
[·]〉 relative to µ iff A ∈ S.
The proof is by induction on the complexity of the formulas, and the case
of formulas of type pB∆ is dealt with indirectly, by using the Reduction
theorem (see §6.4).
It then follows that all the formulas in S, and so all those in Σ, are true
in the constructed model. Given that Σ was an arbitrary consistent set of
formulas, we have:
Strong completeness. Every set of L-formulas which is consistent (rel-
ative to G) is satisable, i.e. has all its members true in some model
relative to some assignment.
And so:
Weak completeness. Every valid formula is a theorem of G.
Remember that by d1 and d2 (§5), ≥d and ≥cd are denable without the
help of ∃. Let then LP be a purely propositional counterpart of L, i.e. a
language just like L but without sentential variables and the quantier. Then
dene p ≥d q as p ≈ q∨p and p ≥cd q as p ≥d q∧p, and consider the system
GP dened on LP exactly like G but without the postulates for existential
quantication. Finally modify the semantics for L in the obvious way so as
to obtain a semantics for LP . It should then be clear that GP is sound and
complete with respect to the modied semantics.21
21 In Correia 2004 I develop a semantics for Angell’s logic of analytic containment (ana-
lytic containment is definable in terms of analytic equivalence, and vice versa) which could
easily be used to model GP . It would be interesting to see how the semantics, which does
not handle quantification, could be modified in order to model G.
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